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INTRODUCTION

In our society the family is the fundamental unit "responsible for and
capable of providing a child, on a continuing basis, with an environment
which serves his numerous physical and mental needs during immaturity."' A child's birth parents are regarded as being the primary social force
responsible for producing and providing this environment. On many occasions, however, this social unit fails to provide an adequate environment.
When such failure occurs, the state steps in, through the adoption process,
and provides the child with another family.
The adoption process consists of two phases: the legal termination of
the relationship between the birth parents and the child 2 and the adoption
itself.I This process can be accomplished in one proceeding or in two separate and distinct proceedings.4 In its quest to provide the child with the

1. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

13 (1973).

2. See TEX. FAM. CODE AN. § 15.07 (Vernon 1975). Although section 15.07 terminates all "legal rights, privileges, duties and powers" between the birth parent and child, the
child still retains his right to inherit through and from his birth parents. See id
3. See id §§ 16.01-16.12.
4. See id §§ 16.03(d), 16.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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type of home and family that society expects, the court's paramount concerns are the rights and welfare of the adopted child; no decision is to be
made unless the court finds it to be in the "best interest" of the child.5
Upon entry of the court's decree of adoption, a parent-child relationship is
created between the adoptive parent and adopted child "as if the child
were born to the adoptive parents during marriage." 6
Notwithstanding statutes which seek to place a child with a deserving
family, many adoptees retain an emotional desire, and often a psychological need, to ascertain the identity of their birth parents.7 This desire or
need is in direct conflict with state statutes mandating that adoption information be sealed and remain confidential.8 The purpose of this comment is
5. Seeid § 16.08(a) (Vernon 1975); see also Davis v. Collins, 147 Tex. 418, 424-25, 216
S.W. 2d 807, 811 (1949) (rights and welfare of child paramount in adoption proceeding);
Stanford v. Stanford, 201 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(rights of child must be carefully guarded and protected).
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09(a) (Vernon 1975); see Clark v. West, 96 Tex. 437, 442,
73 S.W. 797, 799 (1903); Go Int'l, Inc. v. Lewis, 601 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Vaughn v. Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas), aft'd, 461 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1970).
7. See Linda F. M. v. Department of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1304, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (1981). The petitioner summarized her desire ."[t]o know who I am. I feel
cut off from the rest of humanity. I was given birth to the same way as everyone else, but
everyone else can send away three dollars and get a copy of their birth certificate. I want to
know who I am. The only person in the world who looks like me is my son. I have no
ancestry. Nothing."' Id at 1304, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
8. See ALA. CODE § 26-10-28 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150(b) (Supp. 1982);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-120 (Supp. 1982-1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-117 (1971); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10439 (Deering Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-104(1)
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68e (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924 (1981);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16.311 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(12) (West Supp. 1982); Ga.
Code Ann. § 74-417 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-15 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 16.1511 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-12 (Burns
1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2279 (1976); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.570(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81a (West Supp.
1982-1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (Supp. 1982-1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 85 (Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1973); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (555.67) (Callaghan Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.31 (West
1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-25 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.120 (Vernon 1952);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-126(2) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 127.140 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461:11 (1968); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.1 (West
Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-16 (1978); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 114 (Consol.
1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(2) (1981); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.18 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17 (West 1966);
OR. REV. STAT. § 432.420 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-15 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-25-16.4 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-130 (1977);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-15-16
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 452 (1974); VA. CODE § 63.1-235 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV.
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to examine the premises supporting confidentiality and to determine
whether the concept of confidentiality runs counter to the needs of the
adult adoptee. During this examination, cases in which these statutes have
been attacked and the rationales for repulsing these challenges will be examined. Additionally, this comment will suggest procedures to be implemented by the Texas legislature to assist the adult adoptee in a quest for
the identity of his birth parents and, simultaneously, to protect the needs of
the birth parents and adoptive parents.
Although the purpose of this comment is to examine the adult adoptee's
right to access under Texas law, at the time of this writing, no Texas case
has been reported that deals with the application of Texas Family Code
Section 11.17(d), 9 the pertinent statute. Therefore the arguments raised by
inquiring adoptees in cases from other jurisdictions and the reasoning applied by the addressing courts will be relied upon in this analysis.
II.

HISTORY

The practice and custom of adoption has been accepted throughout history, dating back to the Code of Hammurabi (2000 B.C.) and to ancient
Rome.' ° The concept was carried over into countries where the Roman
legal system survived; " however, adoption was not initially accepted
under the English common law. 2 Thus, in those jurisdictions, like Texas,
CODE ANN. §§ 26.32.120(2), 26.32.150 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-4 (1980); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.93(1) (West Supp. 1982-1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104(d) (1982).
9. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This section provides:

The records concerning a child maintained by the district clerk after entry of a decree of
adoption, and all the records required to be maintained by the department are confidential, and no person is entitled to access to or information from these records except
as provided by this subtitle or on an order of the court which issued the decree or of a
district court of Travis County for good cause.
Id
10. See Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 585-86 (Mo. 1906); H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 602 (1968); Huard, The Law of Adoption."
Ancient andModern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1956); Comment, Confidentiality ofAdoption
Records.- An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REv. 817, 817 (1978). The Romans had two forms of

adoption: the adoptis form, the predecessor to modern adoption, was a court order that
transferred an unemanciated minor from the birth father to the adoptive father; adults were

adopted through a form called adrogatio. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 602 (1968).
1I. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 602
(1968). Primarily, these countries were France, Germany and Spain. See id at 602.
12. See id at 603. The concept of adoption was not accepted under the English common law because of the prevalent English belief that land should only be inherited by blood
relatives. See id at 603; see also Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient andModern, 9 VAND.
L. REV. 743, 745 (1956); Comment, Confidentiality o/Adoption Records.- An Examination, 52
TUL. L. REV. 817, 817-18 (1978).
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which base their civil law 3upon the English common law, adoption is
purely a statutory creation.'
The existence of adoption statutes rests solely upon the state's public
policy interest in providing another family for a misplaced child when the
relationship between the birth parent and child has failed." To achieve its
goal of providing for the child's best interest and placing him with a deserving and qualified family,' 5 the court must make intensive inquiry into
intimate details concerning the lives of the involved parties-the adoptive
parents, the birth parents, and any other persons associated with the
adoption. 16
Realizing the intimacy of these details, the legislatures of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes which seal adoption
records, thus clothing adoption files with an aura of confidentiality and
restricting access to the information found therein. 7 State restrictions
vary, "8' but access to adoption files is governed by two basic types of statutes. 19 In those states with "open" disclosure statutes, an adult adoptee has
an absolute right to inspect his adoption records.2" The second type of
13. See, e.g., Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 205, 2 S.W. 372, 373 (1886) (adoption
purely statutory); Lutheran Social Servs., Inc. v. Farris, 483 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (adoption exists solely by reason of statute); Norton v.
Stark, 294 S.W. 689, 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1927, no writ) (in those states adopting common law, adoption depends entirely upon statutes).
14. See In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
15. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.08(a) (Vernon 1975). "If the Court is satisfied that...
the adoption is in the best interest of the child, the court shall make a decree granting the
adoption .... "Id
16. See In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sur. Ct. 1976); People v. Doe, 138
N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (Erie County Ct. 1955).
17. For a complete list of pertinent state statutes see supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
18. See, e.g., Con. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68e (West 1981) (requires certain information regarding birth parents be given, in written form, to adopting parents by finalization of
adoption); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 925 (1981) (petitioner must set forth reason for request;
request granted after investigation only if court finds information necessary, in interests of
child, and disclosure will not prejudice birth or adoptive parents); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26
(1976) (following filing of motion, information released if judge finds it serves bests interests
of child or public). In a few states the release of adoption information is controlled by specific statutory requisites. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(5)(d) (1981) (information
released only upon consent of birth parent). See generally Comment, Sealed Adoption
Records and the ConstitutionalRight of Privacy of the NaturalParent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV.
451, 473 (1982); Comment, Confidentialityof/Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 817, 847-52 (1978).
19. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59:2279 (1979) (adoption record open to inspection by
parties and their attorneys) with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 19821983) (adoption records opened only upon showing of good cause).
20. See ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (Supp. 1982) (open only to parties in interest); IDAHO
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standard, which is followed by a majority of states, allows access upon the
showing of good cause by the petitioner.2
CODE § 16-1511 (1979) (seal may be broken upon motion of adopting parents or adopted
person); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59:2279 (1976) (open to inspection by parties and their attorneys); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65:2423 (original birth certificate opened upon demand of adult
adoptee); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (Supp. 1981) (nonidentifying information released to
adoptee upon reaching age of 21); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-128 (1977) (information released

if judge finds it serves best interest of child). See generally Note, Confirming the Constitutionality of Sealing Adoption Records, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 717, 720 n.12 (1980); Comment,
Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 474 n.159 (1982).

21. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.220(b)(1) (Supp. 1982) (original birth certificate
opened upon court order); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-326(B), 8-120(B) (Supp. 1982)
(adoption records and birth certificate opened upon court order); FLA. STAT. ArN.
§ 63.162(2) (West Supp. 1982) (adoption records opened upon court order). These statutes
require a court order to gain access to records, and the order will not be granted without a
showing of good cause. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 (Mo. 1978) (en banc);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 648 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1977); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1981) (open to inspection only when in best interest of child); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1714(b) (1979) (birth certificate); GA. CODE ANN. § 74417 (1981) (adoption records open upon court order to parties of interest); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, § 1522 (1980) (open only for inspection upon specific court order); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-3-1-12 (Burns 1980) (adoption records); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.570(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1977) (adoption records); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1973)
(court order); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.31 (West 1982) (adoption records); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 193.250(1), 453.120(1) (Vernon 1983) (birth certificate and adoption records); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 127.140 (1981) (adoption records); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.1 (West Supp. 19821983) (adoption records); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7-16(A), 24-14-17(B) (1978) (adoption
records and birth certificate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3705.18(e), 3107.17 (Baldwin 1982)
(birth certificate and adoption records); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.420 (1981) (adoption records);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-15 (Supp. 1982) (adoption records); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 3425-16.4 (1977) (adoption records); VA. CODE § 63.1-235 (Supp. 1982) (adoption records). See
generally Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Record Dilemma, 2 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 542, 544 (1975) (showing of good cause inferred in statutes requiring court
order); Comment, Confirming the Constitutionality of Sealed Adoption Records, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 717, 720 (1980) (court order statutes infer showing good cause); Comment,

Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34

RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 483, n.220 (1982) (good cause requirement implied in statutes requir-

ing good cause). A second group of state statutes provide for access simply upon showing of
good cause. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150(b) (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-117
(1971); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10439 (Deering Supp. 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 19-4-104(1) (1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(555.67) (Callaghan Supp. 1983-1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-25 (1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-8-126(2)(a) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §43-113 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 461.11 (1968); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (Consol. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(2) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17 (West Supp. 1982-1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 207-1780(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-130 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-15-16 (1976); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 452 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26-32-120(2) (Supp. 1983-84); W. VA.
CODE § 484.4 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.93(1) (West Supp. 1982-1983); Wyo. STAT. § I-
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CONFIDENTIALITY

In achieving its goal of promoting the "best interests of the child," legislation mandates22 that adoption information remain confidential.23 Confidentiality furthers this broad legislative purpose in several ways. First,
confidentiality permits the relinquishing birth parents to surrender their
child without public knowledge or moral judgment, and, therefore, assists
them in building a new life.24 Moreover, adoptive parents are protected
from outside forces that can interfere with their creation of a viable family
unit.25 Secondly, confidentiality assists in maintaining the integrity of the
22-104(d) (1982). See also Comment, Confirming the Constitutionality of Sealed Adoption
Records, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 717, 720 (1980) (general standard is that petitioner show
that good cause for release exists); Comment, SealedAdoption Records andthe Constitutional
Right ofPrivacy ofthe NaturalParent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 474 (1982) (most prevalent
standard allows for disclosure upon showing of good cause). Courts have not, however, established a definition for "good cause". See infra pgs. 25-30 and accompanying notes.
22. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
23. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). "Confidentiality" has been defined as
the "individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Id at 599.
24. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751,754 (Ill. 1981) (statutes assure birth parent
that their identity will not be publicly disclosed); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (assurances of secrecy regarding birth
parents' identity affects placing of child with reputable adoption agency and assures birth
parents their actions will not become public knowledge); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d
779, 781 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (assures that discretion of birth mother will be protected); see also
People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (Erie County Ct. 1955) (assures birth parent discretion
will not be divulged); In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (assurance of
confidentiality is important part of birth parents' decision to relinquish child); In re Sage,
586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (confidentiality protects private lives of birth
parents from trauma and disruption in future). See generally Klibanoff, GenealogicalInformation in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, ll FAM. L.Q. 185, 188 (1977); Comment, ConfidentialivofAdoption Records." An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817, 826 (1978);
Comment, The Current Status of the Right ofAdult Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their
NaturalParents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677 (1980) (rationale for adoption closure laws).
25. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (111. 1981) (adoptive parents should be
given opportunity to create stable family relationship); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (adoptive parents must be free
from intervention by birth parents); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sur. Ct. 1976)
(sealed records assure adoptive parents that birth parents will be unable to locate child); see
also People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (Erie County Ct. 1955) (assures adoptive parents
that they may raise child as their own); In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977) (adoptive parents should be free from interference by birth parents); In re Sage, 586
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (adoptive family should be given opportunity to
create stable relationship without outside interference); Klibanoff, GenealogicalInformation
in Adoption.: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 188 (1977) (statutes assure
adoptive parents that birth parents will not interfere and they can develop healthy environment for child); Comment, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins,, 48
S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1200 (1975) (provides environment in which child is encouraged to
identify with adoptive family); Comment, ConfidentialityofAdoption Records.- An Examina-
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adoption process because it encourages complete investigations which assist the court in placing the child with the proper family.2 6 Finally, and
most importantly, confidentiality protects the child from stigma related to
his birth, severs the child from such possible stigma, and gives him the
opportunity to form a strong and healthy relationship with the adoptive
family. 27
As logical and well-intentioned as confidentiality statutes may be, the
adoptee 28 nevertheless often develops a need to learn the identity of his
birth parents.29 In recent years, courts across the country have considered

tion,, 52 TUL. L. REv. 817, 826-27 (1978) (protects adoptive parents from outside influences
that may interfere with development of close family unit); Comment, The Current Status of
the Rights ofAdultAdoptees to Know the Identity of Their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q.
677, 682-83 (1980) (confidentiality overcomes adoptive parents' concern of social stigmas
attached to child).
26. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 700, 704 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (facilitates adequate investigation); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Ill. 1981)
(protection of integrity of adoption process is state's goal); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760,
763 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (primary interest of state is to preserve integrity of adoption process); see also In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sur. Ct.) (1976) (confidentiality
encourages and facilitates adequate investigation into factors for planning adoption and
placing child); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (confidentiality encourages and facilitates pre-adoption investigation); Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in
Adoption.- The Adoptee's Quest and the Law 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 196-97 (1977) (public's primary interest is protection of integrity of adoption process); Comment, The Adult Adoptee's
Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1199-1200 (1975) (confidentitality encourages and facilitates agency's investigation into factors relevant to adoption); Comment, The Current Status of the Right ofAdult Adoptees to Know the Identity of
Their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677, 682 (1980) (closure statutes encourage adequate investigations required during the proceeding).
27. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 755 (11. 1981) (confidentiality protects
child in his new family and insulates him from stigma of illegitimacy); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (protects child
from stigma of illegitimacy and facilitates new relationship between adoptee and adoptive
parents protected from intervention by birth parent); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779,
781 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (assures protection from stigmas attached at birth); see also Klibanoff,
Genealogical Information in Adoption. The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185,
188 (1977) (closure statutes intended to protect child from stigmas attached to birth out of
wedlock); Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV.,
817, 827 (1978) (shields adoptee from status as illegitimate and assists in forming a strong
and healthy relationship with new parents); Comment, The Current Status of the Right of
Adult Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677, 683
(1980) (guarantees that relationship with new parents will develop into "loving and natural
environment").
28. Throughout the remainder of this comment the use of the word "adoptee" pertains
only to adopted persons who have reached adulthood or the age of majority.
29. Interview with Dr. Richard Grant, Executive Director, Children's Service Bureau
of San Antonio, in San Antonio (January 17, 1983). This comment is concerned only with
the adult adoptee's access to information identifying the birth parents. Most adoption agen-
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several cases challenging the validity of confidentiality statutes on constitutional grounds.3 ° Primarily, adoptees have asserted that confidentiality
statutes deny them a fundamental right to privacy, 3' a right
to receive in33
formation, 3 2 and a right to equal protection of the laws.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

A. Challenge Based upon Right to Privacy
Adoptees argue that their identity as human beings is determined in a
large part by the identity of their birth parents; 34 therefore, by denying
cies are willing to release to a requesting adoptee all information contained in their adoption
file concerning medical information and ethnic and religious background, excluding any
information as to the names of the birth parents. The agencies do, however, reserve the right
to use discretion in releasing this information if the relinquishing situation presents circumstances that would breach the promise of confidentiality.
30. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 563
S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977);
In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978), affd sub nom. Linda F. M. v.
Department of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); In re Sage,
586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
31. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760,
761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 648 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Linda
F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978), affd sub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health,
New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
32. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1230 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 752 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 563
S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 648 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977);
In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Linda F. M. v.
Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
33. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1977); Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 752 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 563
S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 648-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1977); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978), af'dsub nom. Linda F. M.
v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978).
34. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981) (adoptee alleged right to
determine one's natural identity); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d
646, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (part of adoptee's identity revolves around informa-
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them automatic access to their birth records, the state is abridging their
constitutional right to privacy. 3" Recognized in a series of landmark
Supreme Court cases,36 the right to privacy obtains its constitutional di37
mension from the penumbra of the express guarantees of the first,
fourth,3 8 fifth, 39 and ninth' amendments, which are made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 4 In challenging the confi-

tion about birth parents); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (right to
receive information regarding birth parent is protected by right to privacy), a/'d sub nom.
Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
35. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (11. 1981) (right to determine one's
natural identity finds basis in one's right to privacy); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo.
1978) (en banc) (privacy abridged by statutes' interference); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d
638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (deprives fundamental right to privacy), affidsub nom. Linda F. M.
v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
36. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right to privacy. The Supreme Court, however, in a line of decisions has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution. Roots of the right have been recognized in the first
amendment, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969), in the fourth and fifth amendments, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967), in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965), in the ninth amendment, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487-99
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment to the Constitution provides that
Id
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech ....
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea" Id.
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment of a grand Jury, . . . nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or without
due process of law. ...
Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The ninth amendment to the Constitution provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id This amendment was added to the Constitution upon
the insistence of James Madison. Madison introduced the amendment to "quiet fears that a
bill of specially enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights
and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that any
others were protected." See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in
part that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id
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dentiality statutes, adoptees rely upon Supreme Court cases which recognize a right to privacy in family relationships.4 2 Thus, they argue that,
since their status as an adoptee is part of a family relationship, they possess
a right to privacy in regard to the identity of their birth parents.4 3 The
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade," however, declared that the guarantee of
personal privacy only applied to those personal rights which are deemed
"'fundamental" " or "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'."46
While the Court has been reluctant to expand the list of fundamental
rights,4 7 the key in determining whether such right is "fundamental" is not
found in comparing relative social significance, but rather by ascertaining
if the asserted right is guaranteed, either explicity or impliedly, by the
Constitution.4 8 Based upon this Supreme Court case, state courts have refused to recognize that the adoptee has a fundamental right to privacy in
ascertaining the identity of his birth parents. 9

42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Several areas within the family relationship are deemed to be protected by the right to privacy. See id at 153 (right to terminate
pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (child rearing and education); see also Alma Soc'y, Inc.
v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). As the Alma
Court noted, adoption situations really deal with two families: first, the birth parents who
have surrendered the child for adoption, and relinquished their relationship with the child,
and second, the adoptive family, which has nurtured the adoptee into adulthood. See id at
1231.
43. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir.) (right to privacy
exists based on familial relationship of adoption), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); In re
Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (I11.
1981) (right to determine identity is privacy right and
rests upon family relationships); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)
(right to privacy abridged by state interference in family relationship). Other adoptees have
asserted that they possess a fundamental right to privacy. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of
Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (confidentiality statutes
abridge fundamental right to privacy); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct.
1978) (sealed record statute denies fundamental right to privacy), aft'dsub nom. Linda F. M.
v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. See idat 152; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (fundamental right is one "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental"); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926) (fundamental right is one
"which lie[s] at the base of all our civil and political institutions").
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
47. See id at 152.
48. See id at 152. The Court provided that personal privacy is only afforded to those
"'fundamental'" rights, or those "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" See id at
152.
49. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981) ("We have found no case
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The right to privacy, even when constitutionally protected, is not absolute.5 ° Since no fundamental right to privacy in regard to adoption relationships has been found,5 the challenged statute will be upheld if it bears
a reasonable reltionship to a permissible state objective.52 The legislative
purpose of confidentiality statutes is to protect the adoption triad-the
birth parents, the adoptive parents, and the child.5 3 Based upon state court
decisions, this purpose clearly falls within the ambit of a permissible state
objective.54 In Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics, 5 the

holding that the right of an adoptee to determine his geneological origin is explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics,
372 A.2d 646, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) ("information regarding the heritage,
background or physical and psychological heredity ... is not so intimately personal as to
fall within the zones of privacy implicitly protected in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights".);
In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (no right to privacy is involved),
aft'd sub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d
283 (1981).
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
51. See In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of
Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Linda F. M., 409
N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (Sur. Ct. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York,
418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (where fundamental right not
involved, restriction will be upheld if not "'unreasonable, not arbitrary,'" and bears a "'rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective.' "); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S., 412, 415 (1920) (classification is permitted, but it must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike").
53. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (I11.
1981) (confidentiality performs
vital social and legal role of balancing interests of child, birth parents, and adoptive parents); In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (statute protects maintenance
of viable system of adoption); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646,
649 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (purpose of Adoption Act is to promote policies and
procedures socially necessary and desirable for protection not only of child placed for adoption, but also for birth and adoptive parents); see also In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638,
646 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (encouragement of adoption of children, "indisputably" legitimate legislative goal), af'dsub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 420 (S.C. 1981) (state
adoption statutes are designed to promote policies and procedures necessary for protection
of all parties involved in adoption); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(legislation must not only serve "best interests of the child," but must also be sensitive to
others involved in adoption--the birth and adoptive parents).
54. See In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Ill. 1981) (a rational relationship exists
between creation of the status of adoptee and state's interest in promoting adoption process);
In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (statute's protection of adoption
process is exercise of a valid state interest); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur.
Ct. 1978) (development of a procedure which will promote, encourage, and facilitate adop-
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court asserted that "constitutional and other personal rights may be limited for the protection of other individuals or the public, and where the
of the right harms those other elements, it may be
absolute exercise
56
restricted.",
The right to privacy asserted by adoptees conflicts with the right to privacy possessed by the birth parent, namely the right to be left alone.5 7 This
right has been deemed the "most comprehensive of rights and the most
valued by civilized man."58 Following the surrender of his or her child, the
birth parent often desires solely to be left alone.5 9

tion is legitimate area of state concern), affdsub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New
York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978) (policy of confidentiality is rationally related to state's objective in maintaining
integrity of adoption process). Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), one commentator has argued that the state's interest in
limiting access to adoption records declines as the adoptee attains adulthood. See Comment,
The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 121112 (1975). In Roe, the Court recognized that as the pregnancy progressed, the various rights
of the mother, the state, and the unborn child "shifted" in importance. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). Accordingly, this same "shifting" of rights is evidenced in adoption.
When the child is young and first adopted, the rights of the child, the adoptive family, and
the birth parents to privacy and the interest of the state in protecting the adoption process
are paramount. This scale of rights becomes balanced as the child reaches adolescence. At
this point the state can regulate access through good cause statutes; however, once the
adoptee attains adulthood, his interests override all others and access should be granted
upon demand. See Comment, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins,
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1211-12 (1975). This analogy was also presented in the concurrence
in Maples. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (Seiler, J., concurring). The Mills court rejected this analogy, holding that the privacy rights of all the parties
to the adoption process remain constant. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics,
372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
55. 372 A.2d 646 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
56. Id. at 651.
57. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir.) (birth parent has
countervailing right of privacy and right to be left alone), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979);
In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (111. 1981) (confidentiality protects birth parent's right to
privacy and right to be left alone); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)
(birth parents right to privacy shall be protected); see also Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of
Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (right to privacy asserted
by adoptees conflict with right to privacy and right to be left alone possessed by birth parents); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (if any privacy right is
involved it is perhaps that of birth parent), affid sub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health,
New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); Bradey v. Children's Bureau of S.C.,
274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (statute creating expectation of confidentiality is protected
by right to privacy).
58. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
59. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979).
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Since the 1944 decision of Prince v. Massachusetts,6 0 the courts have recognized that there exists a "private realm of family life" from which the
state is precluded.6 Encompassed within this realm is the right of any individual to marry, to establish a home, and to bring up children without
state interference.6" Based upon this recognized realm of privacy, courts
have argued that disclosure of adoption information could frustrate the
privacy and right to be left alone enjoyed by the birth parent. 63 The surrendering birth parent, perhaps unwed at the time of the child's birth,'
may later be married and may not have apprised the spouse of the existence of a child.6 5 The appearance of this surrendered child, now an adult,
may not only be an unpleasant surprise, but it could also adversely affect
the birth parents' current marital relationship.6 6 The courts, therefore,
60. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Court has continued to
recognize this realm of privacy and has affirmed the freedom of the family from various
state inteferences. See, e.g., Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (plurality)
(housing ordinance); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974)
(mandatory leave for pregnant teachers); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971)
(court cost payments to obtain divorce).
62. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
63. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (I11.1981) (birth parent's privacy
rights not to be lightly infringed upon) (citing In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978)
(en banc)); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (birth parent's need of
privacy comes readily to mind); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646,
651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (birth parent has a privacy interest, a right to be left
alone); see also Comment, SealedAdoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of
the NaturalParent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 455 (1982).

64. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the ConstitutionalRight ofPrivacy of
the NaturalParent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 455 n.27 (1982). Studies have suggested that
between 60% and 90% of adopted children are born to unwed parents. See id at 455 n.27.
65. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). The court called attention to the likelihood that the birth parent has
chosen not to reveal to his or her spouse or others the facts of an "emotionally unsettling and
potentially socially unacceptable occurrence eighteen or more years ago." See id at 651; see
also In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (adoptee should not be allowed
to present himself to birth parent's new family and reveal tragic secrets of past).
66. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 655-56 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). The Mills court presented two incidents of reconciliations, each
with limited acceptance. One natural mother rebuffed her reappearing daughter because she
had never told her spouse or other family members of the existence of the child. See id at
655. After waiting over four years for the birth mother to tell her family, the adoptee decided
she had an absolute right to approach her half-brother and identify herself. She did so and
the encounter was a positive one. See id at 655. This, however, was in direct disregard of the
birth parent's wishes and, therefore, an invasion of her privacy. See id at 655. A second
incident with another adoptee and birth parent resulted in the disruption of the birth
mother's marriage when her spouse learned of the child's illegitimate birth. See id at 656.
Although these two instances had varied results, two facts were established and recognized
by the court: first, many adoptees who are rebuffed by the birth parent upon the first en-
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have held that the right to be left alone applies to a birth parent and his or
her new family's right to privacy and will protect them from unwanted
intrusions.67
Another aspect of the birth parents' right to privacy-the freedom to
choose-might also be abridged by disclosure of adoption information.6"
Personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education have been recognized by the
Supreme Court as being within one's right to privacy;6 9 thus decisions in
these areas should be as free from state interference as possible.7 ° Since
decisions to begat and bear a child or to terminate one's pregnancy are
within this recognized zone of constitutionally protected privacy, 7 ' any decision to surrender a child for adoption should likewise fall within this
zone. 72 Many birth parents rely on the anonymity of the adoption process

counter will attempt other meaningful encounters, and secondly, any such unexpected contact from the adoptee is an invasion of the birth parent's privacy. See id at 656; see also In re
Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court held that
interference with the family life of the birth parent involves state action and therefore the
right to privacy is protected by the fourteenth amendment due to the participation of the
state judicial system's disclosure of the information to the adoptee. See id at 763.
67. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979) (birth parent's right of privacy and a right to be left alone recognized as vital
interest in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969)) (birth parent "has a right to privacy, a right to be let alone, that...
has. . . been recognized as a vital interest by the United States Supreme Court"); Bradey v.
Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (birth parent's expectation of privacy is
constitutionally protected). See generally Comment, SealedAdoption Records andthe ConstitutionalRight of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 454-57 (1982).
68. See generally Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of
Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 457-61 (1982).
69. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), the Court did not decide whether the right to privacy was limited to married
persons or whether it was also applicable to unwed individuals. This issue was resolved in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), where the Court protected the right of unmarried
persons to use contraceptives. The Eisenstadt Court stated: "[If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." Id at 453; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431
U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (Griswold provides that an individual's decision in matters of childbearing are protected by the Constitution from unjustified state intrusion).
70. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
71. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("the decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to privacy is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy).
72. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (privacy extends to choices
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when assessing the alternatives of giving birth to a child.7 3 Open records
could possibly induce surrendering birth mothers to seek abortions or, alternatively, to place a child illegally through the black market 74 instead of
relinquishing their child to an adoption agency that will place the child. By
maintaining open adoption files, the state could impinge upon the birth
mother's right to privacy by restricting the exercise of her freedom to
choose.7 5 State action in disclosure of adoption information thus potentially confficts with a birth parent's right to privacy by interfering with his
or her constitutionally protected freedom of choice; this conffict can only
be resolved by limiting disclosure to protect the birth parent's right to
privacy.76
A third aspect of the birth parent's constitutional right to privacy, the
right of confidentiality, can also be abridged by the release of identifying
information.77 Although this aspect of the right to privacy has rarely been
dealt with by the Supreme Court, 7 the concept has been defined as "the
involving relationships); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (privacy extends to
child bearing). Therefore privacy should also apply to the decision to surrender a child for
adoption, as this decision relates to family relationships and childbearing. See Comment,
Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the NaturalParent, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 458 (1982).
73. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of
the NaturalParent, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 451, 458 (1982); Comment, The Adult Adoptee's
Right to Know His NaturalHeritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 147 (1973).
74. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (2d Cir.) (sealing of
adoption records "may indeed have been a consideration in the willingness of the real parents to give up the child for adoption"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Kirsch v. Parker,
375 So. 2d 693, 699 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (closed records statute is pro-adoption and antiabortion), modoed, 383 So. 2d 384 (La. 1980); Massey v. Parker, 362 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La.
Ct. App. 1978) (Schott, J., dissenting) (disregard of birth mother's privacy would discourage
adoption as viable alternative to abortion), rev'd on other grounds, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La.
1978); see also Klibanoff, GeneologicalInformation in Adoption." The Adoptee's Quest and the
Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 196 (1977); Comment, SealedAdoption Records and the ConstitutionalRight of Privacyof the NaturalParent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 458 (1982).
75. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
444
U.S. 995 (1979); Massey v. Parker, 362 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (Schott, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979); see also Comment, Sealed Adoption Records
and the ConstitutionalRight ofPrivacyof the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 458
(1982).
76. See Klibanoff, Geneological Information in Adoption." The Adoptee's Quest and the
Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 195 (1977); Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RurGERS L. REV. 451, 461 (1982).
77. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of
the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451,462-65 (1982).
78. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1971). This interest was first discussed as a
distinct part of the constitutional right to privacy in Whalen where the Court characterized
"privacy" as protecting two different kinds of interests: individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and interest in making independent decisions. See id at 599. The
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individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 79 In ascertaining the scope of this right, lower courts have developed two lines of
reasoning in support of its existence. The first line of reasoning is based
upon a person's legitimate expectation of confidentiality."0 Secondly, lower
federal courts have created a "zone of confidentiality," which is deemed
parallel to the zone of privacy protecting intimate decisions. 8 Under this
theory, communications pertaining to "family, marriage, human sexuality
and physical problems" 82 are within the confines of privacy; therefore, information regarding a person's "intimate relationships ' 83 or sexual activities"4 is confidential and is to be protected from disclosure. Under either
standard, the release of identifying information can invade the birth parent's right to confidentiality and thus the right to privacy. Based upon the

right to confidentiality was subsequently referred to in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977). The Court held that Mr. Nixon's privacy rights extended to
materials in which he had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in regard to those papers
dealing with his personal matters. See id at 457-59 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351-53 (1967)).
79. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181,189 n. 15 (E.D. La. 1980) (freedom to control information available about oneself
is protected by right of privacy).
80. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (state senators
have legitimate expectation of privacy in financial records); Martinelli v. District Court In
and For Denver, Colorado, 612 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1980) (police officer has legitimate
expectation of privacy in materials in personnel file; remanded for incamera determination);
Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(persons interviewed and evaluated by psychologists while conducting search for potential
applicants for job had legitimate expectation of privacy in papers compiled), rev'd on other
grounds, 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
81. See, e.g., Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1038, 1043 (D.
Hawaii 1979) (confidentiality protects psychiatric reports); Shuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F.
Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (zone of privacy encompasses matters involved in one's sexual activities); McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1380-81 (D.N.J. 1978) (information
from psychiatric interview is within protection of confidentiality); accord Fultz v. Superior
Court, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (information regarding one's sexual
activities is within zone of privacy).
82. Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (D. Hawaii 1979).
83. See Martinelli v. District Court In and For Denver, Colorado, 612 P. 2d 1083, 1092
(Colo. 1980); Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83, 90-93 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
84. See, e.g., Shuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (right to
confidentiality justifies policeman's refusal to answer questions about sexual activities when
unrelated to job performance); Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Officers Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 480
(Alaska 1977) (requiring physician who counselled patients on sexual problems and prescribed contraceptives to reveal patient's names would violate patient's right to privacy);
Fultz v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (Cal. 1979) (woman's refusal to answer
interrogatories in paternity action within constitutional right to privacy as answers dealt
with her sexual relationships).
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practices and procedures of adoption agencies and the statethe birth parent has a legitimate expectation in confidentiality.85 Any disclosure of information would, therefore, breach this expectation of confidentiality and
86
perhaps deter the birth parent from surrendering a child for adoption.
Identity of the birth parent also falls within that zone of private matters
protected from disclosure: the right to privacy protects a person in his intimate relationships and no relationship is so intimate as one involving sexual activities.87 Disclosure could allow intimate facts regarding the birth
parent to be known and, consequently, violate the right to privacy of the
birth parent.8
B.

Challenge Based upon Right to Receive Information

Adoptees have also based constitutional challenges of confidentiality
statutes on the right to receive information and ideas.89 In presenting this
argument, adoptees rely on Stanley v. Georgia,90 and other landmark decisions holding that the right to receive information is protected by the first
amendment. 9' Commentators have additionally argued that the stifling of
this information interferes with the adoptee's development of the positive
85. See Comment, Discovery Rights of the Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the NaturalParent."
A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 65, 76-78 (1975). State statutes place
some conditions upon the release of identifying information such as requiring the adoptee to
show good cause for access or to obtain a court order. Based upon these statutory assurances, some state courts have held that the birth parent has a legitimate expectation of privacy and, thus, a right to confidentiality has been created. See, e.g., Massey v. Parker, 369
So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979) (real expectation of privacy was created by statute requiring
compelling necessity to open records); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc) (statute releasing adoption information only upon court order caused birth parents to
believe they would remain anonymous); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372
A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (right of privacy of birth parent is expressly
assured by law requiring good cause for disclosure).
86. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of
the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 451, 464 (1982).
87. See id at 465.
88. See id at 465.
89. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1230 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751,752-54 (11. 1981); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760,
761-62 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 648 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Linda
F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. 1978), aff'dsub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health,
New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
90. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
91. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (first
amendment's purpose is to preserve marketplace of ideas); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969) (right to receive information and ideas protected by Constitution); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("This freedom [of speech and press] ...necessarily
protects the right to receive information").
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self-image necessary for functioning effectively and confidently in society.92 The right to receive information is essential in the personal life of the
individual.9 3 In order to develop into an integrated, healthy person capable of societal participation,9 4 many adoptees feel the need to have access
to both information
and ideas which will contribute to his self95
awareness.
While the Mills court acknowledged the right of individuals to receive
important information,9 6 it reiterated the precept that no constitutional or
personal right is so absolute as to exclude the constitutional or personal
rights of other individuals. 97 Once again, the adoptee's claimed right of
access to information conflicts with the birth parent's right to privacy. 98 In
holding that the challenged New Jersey statute9 9 did not unconstitutionally
abridge the adoptee's right to receive information and ideas, 1°° the court
emphasized that the "good cause" statute did not completely deny access
to the information sought.' ' This limitation was viewed by the court as
both the exercise of a valid state interest in protecting the integrity of the
0 2
adoption process and a balancing of the rights of the parties involved.1
C. Challenge Based upon Equal Protection
Adoptees have also argued that sealed record statutes deny them equal
protection of the laws because nonadoptees can readily gain access to their

92. See generally Comment, The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1204-05 (1975).

93. See id at 1205.
94. See id at 1205.
95. See id at 1205.
96. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 652 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
97. See id. at 652.
98. See id at 652; see also Comment, The CurrentStatus of the Right ofAdult Adoptees
to Know the Identity oTheirNaturalParents,58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677, 695 (1980) (citing Mills
v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d.646, 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977)
(no constitutional right is so absolute as to exclude rights of other individuals).
99. See N.J. STAT. ArN. § 26:8-40.1 (West Supp. 1982-83) (New Jersey good cause
statute).
100. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 652 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
101. See id at 652.
102. See id at 652. The Maples court reached the same conclusion as did the Mills
court but relied on distinguishing the recipients of the information. According to the Maples
court, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), upholds the free flow of information and
ideas from one person to another. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978) (en
bane). As the information sought here is obtained through a judicial proceeding, the state
has a valid interest in the protection of the adoption system. See id at 762.
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birth records.' °3 Based on the premise that most adoptees are illegitimates,"14 adoptees assert that they are treated differently than nonadopted
illegitimates who have unlimited access to their birth records. 105 Adoptees
also argue that confidentiality statutes confer upon them the status of a
suspect class, therefore subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny. "0Constitutional principles of equal protection do not require that all persons be
treated identically.' 0 7 When the imposed classification abridges a fundamental right, however, its validity will be sustained only when the state
shows a compelling reason.' 0 8 To fall within the purview of a suspect class,
it must be established that the classification is "an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth"'" and secondly, that the class
has a history of being discriminated against.I" Using this established definition to guide their decisions, the courts have unanimously rejected
adoptees' suspect class argument. "' In Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon ,112 the

103. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d
760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.Div. 1977); In
re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (Sur. Ct.), affd sub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of
Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); Bradey v. Children's Bureau,
274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). See
generaly Comment, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know, His Origins, 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1205 (1979); Comment, The Adoptee's Right to Know His NaturalHeritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 145 (1973).
104. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.) (adoptees alleged
they were entilted to same constitutional protections afforded illegitimates as majority of
adoptees are illegitimates), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); see also Comment, Breaking
The Seal" Constitutionaland Statutory Approaches to Adult Adoptee's Right to Identitfy, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 316, 334 (1980) (recognizing most adoptees are illegitimate); Comment, A
Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's SealedRecordDilemma, 2 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 542, 550
(1975) (estimating that 60% of adoptees are illegitimate).
105. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 652 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch.Div. 1977).
106. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.) (adult adoptees
are suspect class and therefore statute is subject to strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (strict scrutiny required as
statute imposes status of suspect class); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (Sur. Ct.
1978) (more exacting test of strict scrutiny should be applied as statute creates suspect class),
affd sub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d
283 (1981).
107. See Eisenstandt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972).
108. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (classification which penalizes fundamental right sustained only upon
state's showing of compelling governmental interest).
109. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
110. See id at 685-87.
111. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (statute does not create
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court reasoned that adoptees were treated differently due to their status as
adoptees, not due to any status as illegitimates. " 3 Extending this rationale,
the Mills court stated that the adoptee does not obtain his status by accident of birth; his status is derived from a legal proceeding which occurs
after the child's birth. 14 It is also clear that the second requirement, that
the class have a history of being discriminated against, is not met by the
class of adoptees. "' The objectives of the adoption process are to place the
child with a new family that is capable of creating a loving, stable relationship."' It cannot be said with any degree of accuracy, therefore, that
adoptees are being, or have a history of being, discriminated against." 7
Unless adoptees can establish the existence of a fundamental right or
establish that they constitute a suspect class, strict scrutiny will not apply to
sealed records statutes." 18 Courts will uphold these statutes as a valid exercise of the state's power if they are reasonable and bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state goal." 9 That the confidentiality statutes meet this
suspect class); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 645 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (adoptees not a
suspect class), a.9'd sub nom Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302,
437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981)
(adoptee's status under law does not constitute suspect class).
112. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
113. See id at 1234.
114. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); see also In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751,756 (11. 1981) (status of adoptee
derived from legal proceeding whose purpose is protecting best interest of child).
115. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234 (2d Cir.) (adoptees have
no history of discrimination), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1975); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d
760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (adoption system protects abandoned or neglected children);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Health, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977)
(situation of adopted child is often improved by challenged statute).
116. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (adoption improves status
of child by providing home, support, family unit, and loving care that might not otherwise
be present); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (adoption provides
system of protection for neglected, abandoned, or surrendered children); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (adoption
insures home and family relationship which otherwise may not exist).
117. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dep't of Health, 372 A.2d 646, 653-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
118. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (rational
basis test applied when strict scrutiny not applicable); see also In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d
751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (suspect class not involved; therefore, state need only have rational basis
for statutory classification); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Health, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (where fundamental right not penalized, state must only show
rational basis for statute); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 645 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (suspect
class not involved; statute must only meet rational basis test), aj7'dsub nom. Linda F. M. v.
Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); In re Sage, 586 P.2d
1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (unless suspect class involved, rational basis is applied).
119. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (rational basis met if it
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rational basis test is seen by examining the goals of the sealed record statutes: protection of the adoptee from any social stigmas, protection of the
privacy rights of the birth parent, protection of the adoptive parents from
outside interference, and safeguarding the adoption process. 120 Since the
sealed record statutes are rationally related to promoting the interests of
the parties
to the adoption, the adoptee is not denied equal protection of
2
the law. 1
D. Summary of ConstitutionalChallenges
In addressing adoptees' constitutional challenges to sealed record statutes, the courts have unanimously held that denial of automatic access to
adoption records does not abridge any constitutional right of the
adoptee. 2 2 Challenges founded on the denial of a fundamental right to
serves legitimate state interest); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646,
653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (if reasonable basis for classification exists and such
distinction has rational relationship to objective sought, then equal protection not violated);
In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 645-46 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (equal protection not violated if
statute bears rational relationship to valid state objective), aff'd sub nom. Linda F. M. v.
Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); see also In re Sage,
586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (except in cases involving suspect class or fundamental rights, equal protection afforded if supported by legitimate state interest).
120. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.) (state may
consider choices of birth parents and protect these choices; may also protect adopting parents and adoptee), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754-55
(Ill. 1981) (confidentiality protects privacy of birth parents, assists adopting parents in creating family unit and protects adoptee from stigmas); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Health,
372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (purpose of Act is protection not only of
adoptee, but also of adopting parents and birth parents); see also Klibanoff, Geneological
Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest andthe Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 196-97 (1977).
121. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234 (2d Cir.) (statute supported by important state interest so equal protection not abridged), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (adoption does not deny
equal protection); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Health, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1977) (statute supported by rational state interest; no equal protection violated).
122. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233, 1236 (2d Cir.) (good
cause statute is not violation of any constitutional right possessed by adoptees), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 995 (1979); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754, 756, 757 (Ill. 1981) (no constitutional right of adoptee violated by sealed records statute); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760,
762, 764-65 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (sealed record statute does not deny any constitutionally
protected rights of adoptee); see also In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Health, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re
Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1981); In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644-45
(Sur. Ct. 1978), arf'dsub nom. Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302,
437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981); In re
Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). But see Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 434-36 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). The adoptees
challenged the constitutionality of a sealed record statute; the federal court abstained from
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privacy have not been sustained; the scope of fundamental rights is narrow
and adoptees have failed to establish that the right to privacy involved in
ascertaining the identity of their birth parents is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the constitution."13 Even if adoptees were able to sustain a
right to privacy, the right would not be absolute;I24 this asserted right must
be examined in relation to the countervailing right to privacy possessed by
the birth parents. 25 Assuming that upon attaining adulthood the adoptee
no longer needs the protection of the adoption process, the same cannot be
said for the birth parents.' 2 6 Their interest in a right to privacy does not
diminish over time; it, perhaps, intensifies.' 2 7 Examined in light of the
right of privacy of the birth parents, an adoptee's right to privacy is not
violated by confidentiality statutes.
The challenge of the adoptees' right to receive information has also
failed. While the Mills court recognized that adoptees have a right to receive information, this right is not absolute or paramount to the countervailing rights of others.' 2 I Again, this right must be balanced with the
privacy right of the birth parent.
Challenges based upon denial of equal protection of the laws, thus subjecting the challenged statutes to a strict scrutiny test, also have not succeeded.'2 9 Since adoptees have failed to establish the existence of a
fundamental right 30 or their status as a suspect class,13 ' the challenged
reversing trial court's dismissal due to lack of state court decisions, addressing state statute.
See id at 435.
123. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981) (adoptee's right to ascertain identity of birth parent not explicitly or implicitly protected by Constitution); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977)
(information requested by adoptee does not fall within constitutionally protected privacy);
In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (no privacy right of adoptee is
involved), affd sub nom Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981).
124. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
125. See id at 651.
126. See In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (Ill. 1981).
127. See id at 755-56.
128. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
129. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753-56 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d
760, 762-65 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d
646, 650-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
130. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231-33 (2d Cir.) (adoptees
possess no fundamental right to receive information in ascertaining birth parents' identity),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762-64 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)
(no fundamental right impinged upon); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372
A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (no fundamental right involved).
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statutes will be upheld only if supported by a valid state objective. 32 The
objective of the adoption process is to create a new family environment for
a child following the surrender by the birth family. Clearly, this is a valid
state objective and the confidentiality statutes are rationally related to this
objective.
V.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "GOOD CAUSE"

Despite rejection of constitutional arguments presented in support of automatic access to birth records, adoptees are not completely precluded
from access to their sought-after information. State legislatures realize that
regardless of assurances of secrecy, competing interests may warrant disclosure; 33 therefore, legislatures have formulated statutes granting access
conditioned upon compliance with statutory requisites. ' The Texas legislature, in addition to legislatures in a majority of other states, has enacted
35
a statute providing for disclosure upon the showing of "good cause", 36
Statutes and case law fail to provide a precise definition of good cause.,
The judge, therefore, is allowed wide discretion and must make his decision on a case-by-case basis.' 37 The mere desire to learn the identity of
one's birth parents or mere curiosity alone does not constitute good

131. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir.) (status of
adoptees does not constitute suspect class), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); In re Roger B.,
418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (statute does not create suspect class); In re Maples, 563
S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (adoptees not suspect class).
132. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Il1. 1981) (as no fundamental right is
involved, statute will be upheld on rational basis test); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762
(Mo. 1978) (en banc) (no constitutional infringement so statute will be upheld if exercise of
valid state interest); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (as no fundamental right is involved, statute will be upheld if it
bears rational relationship to state objective).
133. See In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981). Birth parent's right to privacy,
however, is not absolute. See id at 756.
134. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (states with good cause access statutes).
135. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
136. See Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (to meet "good
cause" requirement, adoptee must demonstrate compelling need for identifying information); see also Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1304, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (1981) (must show compelling and concrete need to establish good cause);
In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (no precise definition; flexibility
desired).
137. See, e.g., Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1304, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (1981) (courts to decide on case-by-case basis whether good cause exists);
Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (determination of compelling
need depends on circumstances of each case); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978) (judge must be allowed wide discretion and decisions should be made on caseby-case basis).
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cause; 138 there must be more. The requesting adoptee must also show a
present need for the requested information.' 3 9 Courts have found good
cause to exist when: the adoptee's search is inspired by religious beliefs
which requires them to trace their ancestry and perform certain religious
services for blood relatives;" 0 the adoptee desires information to ascertain
and establish his inheritance rights from his birth parents;' 4 ' the adoptee is
motivated by well-documented emotional or psychological disturbances; 42 and the desired information relates to medical, ethnic, or hereditary information. "43 Although the burden of showing good cause is

138. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (adoptee must show that need is more than mere curiosity); Linda F. M.
v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1304, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (1981) ("Nevertheless, mere desire to learn the identity of one's natural parents cannot alone constitute
good cause, or the requirement of section 114 (good cause statute) would become a nullity").
139. See In re Linda F. M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (present need to view
records must be shown), aft'd sub noma.Linda F. M. v. Dep't of Health, New York, 418
N.E.2d 1302, 437 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981). In other words, the adoptee bears the burden of
proof. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (burden on applicant to
show good cause); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (burden to show good cause upon party seeking access).
140. See In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978).
141. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Parker, 383 So. 2d 384, 387 (La. 1980) (possible inheritance
rights constitute compelling reason for opening sealed records); Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d
1310,' 1314 (La. 1979) (right to inherit from both parents may constitute compelling cause);
Chambers v. Parker, 349 So. 2d 424, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (sealed record statute does not
prevent adoptees from asserting inheritance rights). Texas provides by statute that upon the
termination of the birth parent's legal rights, the child retains the right to inherit from and
through the birth parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The
Massey court provided that prior to releasing the requested information, the court should
determine whether there is an estate from which the adoptee can inherit. See Massey v.
Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979). The lower court was thus instructed to appoint a
curator ad hoc to ascertain if the birth parents were named and, if so, to launch an investigation to ascertain if an estate exists. See id at 1315. If the identity of the birth parents could
not be ascertained, then no relief could be granted. See id at 1315. If identifying information on birth parents were found, the court was to determine how the rights of the adoptee
could be secured, giving full consideration to the assurances of confidentiality accorded the
birth parents. See id at 1315. The court reiterated that the "utmost discretion and confidentiality must be observed" in the steps taken. See id at 1315.
142. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 655-56 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1976). But see
In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483-84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977). Without corroboration from an
expert witness, the trial court heard applicant's testimony that he was suffering from an
emotional disturbance caused by his not knowing the identity of his birth parent; access was
granted. See id at 481. The appeals court vacated and remanded the case with instructions
that the trial court conduct a full factual determination hearing on the ultimate issue of
whether release of the information would be in the best interest of the child. See id at 484.
143. See Chattman v. Bennett, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). The
Chatiman court, holding that medical information and information containing genetic or
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usually upon the adoptee, the Mills court provided that once the adoptee
attains majority, the burden shifts to the state to establish that good cause
does not exist.'" In carrying its burden, the state must consider the needs
of the adoptee, the rights of the birth parents and the adoptive parents, and
the state's interest in maintaining a viable adoption process. 4 5 Each decision must be made on an individual basis with the court's ultimate decision resting
on a balancing of the rights and interests of the parties
46
involved. 1

To assist the magistrate in arriving at a proper decision, several courts
have established inquiry procedures providing for court investigations into
access requests. 147 These procedures are designed to protect the rights of
hereditary information should be freely disclosed, allowed an adoptee to inspect her adoption and medical records as well as those of her birth parents. It was further provided that
nonpertinent information, including the names of the birth parents, be deleted. See id at
768-69; see also Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (requests for medical, ethnic, or hereditary background should be
granted, absent showing of compelling reason not to disclose); In re Female Infant, 5 FAM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2311, 2312-13 (1979) (release of medical information about birth family promotes and protects adoptee's welfare); Comment, The Current Status of the Right of Adult
Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677, 699 (1980)
(medical information should be released upon request).
144. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
145. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (state's primary concern is protection of adoption system, thus serving best interests of child); In re
Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (determination of what constitutes good
cause must include determination of rights of adopted child and his adoptive parents, determination of rights conferred by statute on birth parents of child, and any common law rights
available); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1977) (in determining whether records should be released, court must weigh needs
of adoptee against birth parent's rights; neither party's right is absolute).
146. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651-52 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (good cause statute grants court power to weigh and balance
competing privacy interests and make determination based on facts and circumstances of
individual case); In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (in making determination, court should carefully weigh interests of child, public, and adoptive and birth parents); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (court must weigh
interests of parties).
147. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 656 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1976); In re
Daniel Doe, No. 76-CO-2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Nov. 22, 1977) (cited in Yesterday's
Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431,433-34 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978)).
The Mills court established a procedure calling for the appointment of an intermediary
agency empowered to investigate each request. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). The agency would be allowed
access to court records and would be responsible for conducting an investigation and submitting to the court a report of its findings and recommendations. See id at 656. The agency
so appointed would be the agency that originally placed the adoptee; however, if the placing
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the parties involved, to lessen the burden on the adoptee where good cause
exists, and to effectuate the legislative intent of the access statutes. 148 Each
of these procedures share common elements: they require that the birth
parents be sought out and, if found, contacted and advised of the pending
request.' 49 If the birth parent is, in fact, located and contacted, the birth
parent may or may not consent to the release of the requested informaagency no longer exists or the placement was private, the court selects an agency. The
agency is not allowed to reveal the nature of its inquiry to any persons other than the birth
parents. The intermediary attempts to locate the birth parents and to obtain their consent to
release the identifying information; if such consent is obtained, the information is automatically released. Upon the request of the birth parents and after securing a court order, the
intermediary may also arrange a contact between the adoptee and the birth parents. Such
court order will not be granted, however, if the court feels that the meeting would be "harmful" to either of the parties. If the birth parents refuse to consent to the release of identifying
information, the adoptee may appeal. The appeals court must resolve the issue by examining
both the adoptee's grounds for access and the report of the intermediary. See id. at 656. In In
re Daniel Doe, No. 76-CO-2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Nov. 22, 1977) (cited in Yesterday's
Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 433-34 (7th cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978)),
an Illinois court also called for an investigation. An investigator was appointed and was
instructed to contact the birth and adoptive parents to notify them of the pending proceeding
and to advise them that the requested information would be released unless evidence that
substantial harm would result from the release of such information was presented to the
court. See Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978). Although leave to intervene will be granted, the intervening party must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that substantial harm would result from the release of the requested information. Absent such showing, the court will order the opening of
adoption records and the original birth certificate for the adoptee's inspection. If the birth
parents are not located within a "reasonable time," the petitioner will be required to publish
notice of the pending proceeding for thirty days in a publication of general circulation. If no
appearance is made, the access requested will be granted. See id at 434. A New York court
in In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sur. Ct. 1976), declared that the birth parents were
necessary parties to the litigation and, thus, were required to be served with notice. See id at
782. In keeping with the concept of confidentiality and cognizant of the fact that the birth
parent's anonymity would be destroyed by participating in the litigation, the court provided
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. See id. at 782. But see In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d
479, 481 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting argument that birth parents are necessary parties).
See generally Comment, The Current Status of the Right ofAdult Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their Natural Parents, 58.WASH. U.L.Q. 677, 700-01 (1980).
148. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 656 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (intermediary to attempt to locate and contact birth parents and advise
them of pending proceeding).
149. See, e.g., Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 433-34 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978) (citing In re Daniel Doe, No. 76-CO-2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County Nov. 22, 1977)) (investigator to locate birth parents and advise them petition will be
granted unless show substantial harm would result from disclosure); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (intermediary to
attempt to locate and contact birth parents and advise them of pending proceedings); In re
Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (court appoints guardian ad litem to
represent served birth parents).
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tion. 15 0 For those contacted birth parents who consent, the court investigations provide an equitable solution to the access problem; however, for
those birth parents who refuse to consent to the release of the information,
the investigation clearly invades their right to privacy. 5 ' Years after making the difficult decision to surrender their child, the birth parents are once
again confronted with assessing the correctness of that decision and deal52
ing with whatever guilt and emotion may have accompanied the choice.'
Faced with the possibility of diametrically opposed reactions, it would
seem that a wiser and more efficient approach to this dilemma would be
first to require a hearing on the merits of the petition.' 5 3 Then, if the petitioner/adoptee fails to sustain his burden of proof, neither the adoption
records nor the privacy of the birth parent would be disturbed.' 5 4 Even if
the petitioning adoptee carries forth his burden of good cause, the court
should not be required to release all of the information contained in the
sealed record. 55 While the good cause shown may necessitate the disclosure of some information within the file, such as medical, ethnic, or herediit may not necessitate the revelation of the birth parent's
tary information,
56
identity.'
VI.

SUGGESTIONS FOR TEXAS STATUTORY REFORM

The current legislative scheme protects those birth parents, adoptive
parents, and adoptees who believe and desire that all adoption records
should be kept confidential. In keeping with the legislative goal of serving
the best interests of the child, it is imperative that the legislature recognize
the need of some adoptees to have access to more information regarding
150. See, e.g., Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978) (citing In re Daniel Doe, No. 76-CO-2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County Nov. 22, 1977)) (birth parents may consent to release or intervene to deny release);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1977) (consent of birth parents allows adoptee automatic access; refusal by birth parent creates right of adoptee to appeal); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 782 (Sur. Ct. 1976)
(attorney ad litem appointed to protect rights and interests of birth parents).
151. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right 0/Privacy of
the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. Rav. 451, 455 (1982).
152. See id at 457-61.
153. See In re Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
154. See id at 542.
155. See In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
156. See id at 766. The Maples court recognized that "[t]he disclosure of some information does not require the entire record be thrown open, instead, only so much information as the court adjudges necessary for the good cause shown should be disclosed." See id
at 766; see also Chattman v. Bennett, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (court
granted release of requested hereditary and genetic information but ordered deletion of
nonpertinent information such as identity of birth parents).
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their adoption. 57 There also exists a group of birth parents who would
consent to the request for the release of information or who would freely
identify themselves to their surrendered child if they knew the child
wanted to know.' 5 8 As adoption is a purely statutory creation, any reform
must also be statutory.
Many adoptees seeking additional information do not necessarily want
identifying information; they desire medical, ethnic, or hereditary information.' 59 This request could easily be met by amending the existing
Texas confidentiality statute 160 to provide for the division of the adoption
file into two parts: identifying information and nonidentifying information. 1 6 ' To serve its purpose effectively, the nonidentifying information file
should contain information regarding the birth parents:
(1) age at the time of the adoptee's birth;
(2) heritage background, including ethnic, race, and religious
background;
(3) education completed at time of adoptee's birth and future education plans;
(4) physical appearance, including height, weight, build, eye and
hair color, skin complexion and coloring;
(5) existence of any other blood siblings, their sexes, and ages at
the time of the adoptee's placement and whether they were surrendered for adoption; and,
including allergies, blood types, and
(6) detailed health reports
62
diseases.'
known family
157. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. 1981) (legislature has not totally
denied access to adoption records but simply requires court to determine if request is justified); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.

Div. 1977) (legislature has recognized that countervailing interest of adoptee may warrant
disclosure); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (statute allows

access to records upon showing of good cause). By adopting "good cause" and court order
statutes, legislatures have recognized that access may be granted.
158. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 995 (1979). In Alma, the appellant cited one study which indicated that of 152 birth
families randomly selected, 128 of them agreed to meet their surrendered child, now an
adult. See id at 1233 n.13.
159. Interview with Dr. Richard Grant, Executive Director, Children's Service Bureau
of San Antonio, in San Antonio (January 17, 1983). Most adoption agencies will release to a
requesting adoptee all information contained in their adoption file concerning medical information and ethnic and religious background.
160. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
161. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right ofPrivacy of
the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. Rav. 451, 486 (1982).

162. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68(e) (West 1982) (calling for compilation
and subsequent release of certain information to adoptive parents by date adoption is final);
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Nonidentifying information should be released at the adoptee's request.' 6 3
When identifying information is sought, the court must distinguish between those birth parents who would not object to disclosure and those
who would object. One solution to this problem would be to allow the
birth parent to sign a consent to the release of the information either at the
time of the adoption or any time before the child reaches majority.' 6 4 A
better solution to this problem, however, would be the creation of a voluntary registry system where both adoptees and birth parents can register a
desire to meet their lost child or parent.' 65 Under such a system, consenting birth parents and desiring adoptees could be matched without hav66
ing to go through the time, expense, or emotion of a court proceeding.1
Based upon proposals of the Texas Committee for Adoption, legislation
has been presented to the sixty-eighth legislature
that provides for the crea67
tion of a Voluntary Adoption Registry.'
§§ 600.8(l)(c)(1), 600.8(l)(c)(2) (1981) (birth parents to supply detailed
nonidentifying information); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25(d) (Supp. 1981) (providing for compilation of detailed nonidentifying information); see also TEX. S.B. 777, 68th Leg. (1983);
TEX. H.B. 1174, 68th Leg. (1983). Each of these proposed bills calls for an amendment to
section 16.03 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03 (Vernon 1975).
The proposals mandate the compilation of available health, social, educational, and genetic
history of the adoptee. Included within the genetic history of the adoptee is information
pertaining to the health, medical history, age, education, religious and ethnic information of
the birth parents. It is further provided that no adoption may be granted until such report is
provided to the adopting parents. See TEX. S.B. 777, 68th Leg. (1983); TEX. H.B. 1174, 68th
Leg. (1983).
163. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68(h) (West 1981) (nonidentifying information
released to adult adoptee upon request); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924 (1981) (nonidentifying information can be released to any party of adoption proceeding); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 600.16(l)(b), 600.8(1)(c)(1), 600.8(l)(c)(2) (West 1981) (complete medical information
available on request); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (Supp. 1982-1983) (medical or
genetic information available when adoptee reaches majority); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(555.68(1)) (Callaghan Supp. 1982-1983) (all nonidentifying information released upon request of adult adoptee); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25(d) (Supp. 1981) (nonidentifying information released upon written request by adult adoptee); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(3) (1981)
(nonidentifying information released upon request).
164. See Comment, Confidentiality oAdoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 817, 853 (1978).
165. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:91-40:99 (West Supp. 1983) (Louisiana State Voluntary Registry Act).
166. See Comment, Sealed Adoption Records and the ConstitutionalRight of Privacy of
the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 486 (1982).
167. See TEX. S.B. 777, 68th Leg. (1983). The proposed Senate bill provides for the
establishment of a central voluntary registry system within the Department of Human Resources and also for the establishment of voluntary registries by placement agencies.
Records for adoptions granted after January 1, 1984, will be deposited with the registry, but
will remain confidential. For adoptions granted prior to January 1, 1984, records may be
voluntarily forwarded to the registry by the placing agency. The registry is designed to assist
IOWA CODE ANN.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

29

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 1, Art. 5

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:153

Even with the establishment of a voluntary registry system, some
adoptees could still be forced to seek identifying information by resorting
to the courts. This is particularly true in those situations where the adoptee
is asserting his right to inherit from his birth parents."6 8 Keeping in mind
that the termination procedures sever all legal relationships between the
birth parent and child,' 6 9 the retention by the adoptee of his right to inherit from his birth parents seems inconsistent with termination of the
birth parent/child relationship and should be abolished. 7 °
Adoptees may also resort to the courts under other circumstances. If the
birth parent has not filed an application with the registry system, it would
stand to reason that he or she does not desire to be put into contact with his
or her surrendered child. In these cases, the needs of the adoptee may directly conflict with the privacy rights of the birth parent. When faced with
such a conflict, the court should not allow disclosure.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The adoptee's right of access to his birth and adoption records has
gained increasing public attention in recent years. With this increase in
public awareness, and perhaps public empathy, it is not surprising that

adoptees, birth parents, pre-adoption and post-adoption siblings to locate each other. To
qualify for registry participation, each applicant, whether it be adoptee, birth parent or birth
sibling, is required to submit a detailed application containing as much pre-adoption and
post-adoption information as possible. Each application is reviewed and is subject to acceptance or rejection by the administrator. Acceptance is conditioned upon the applicant's undergoing a counselling session with a professional counselor. Once an application is
accepted, it is monitored; the goal is matching another application. If a match is made, the
applicant is informed by registered mail, acceptance only by named addressee. Once the
applicant is informed of the match, he is advised that he may withdraw his consent or request. Following notification of a match, no identifying information will be released except
upon a face-to-face meeting between the applicant and the registry administrator. See id ; see
also TEX. H.B. 1174, 68th Leg. (1983). In addition, the House Bill provides for matching of
the adoptee with one birth parent without the registration of the other birth parent under
certain circumstances. See id. at § 49-015.
168. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This statute provides that upon the termination of the relationship between the child and the birth parent,
the child retains his rights to inherit from and through the birth parent. See id
169. See id The statute provides in part that a "decree terminating the parent-child
relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers,
with respect to each other ....
" Id
170. See Epstein, InheritanceRights of an Adopted Childin Texas, 6 Hous. L. REV. 350,
354 (1968). In the last three decades the number of states expressly prohibiting inheritance of
adoptees from birth parents has dramatically increased. In 1936, nine states prohibited
adoptees inheriting from their birth parents. By 1966 at least 23 states had such prohibiting
statutes. See id at 354.
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inquisitive adoptees have turned to the courts to challenge the veil of secrecy surrounding their beginnings.
Keeping in mind the purposes of the adoption process, courts have uniformly rejected adoptees' constitutional challenges to the validity of confidentiality statutes. Yet the courts have also recognized that this soughtafter information is significant to the adoptee. As the adoption process affects the lives of numerous people, the court must reach a decision that
benefits all of the parties involved in the process, with particular attention
to the needs of the adoptee and the birth parent.
Inquiring adoptees should be allowed automatic access to all nonidentifying information within the records of the court and the placing agency.
Securing this information may satisfy the need of the adoptee for information. Additionally, the release of this type of information does not violate
any privacy right of the birth parent, since it would not reveal identity.
For those adoptees seeking to ascertain the identity of their birth parents, the legislature should fashion options, other than court actions, which
assist adoptees in ascertaining the identity of their parents. One such option would be a voluntary adoption registry system to assist adoptees and
birth parents in locating each other, if both parties so desire. In those situations where the adoptee must resort to the courts, however, the court
should again engage in a delicate balancing system in which the privacy
interests of the birth parents should predominate.
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